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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONDEAT SU-
PERIOR IN FIRST AMENDMENT CASES. Embrey v. Holy, 293
Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966 (1982).
A radio broadcaster and his employer were held liable for the de-
famatory remarks made by the broadcaster on his radio program.' The
plaintiff, a television broadcaster, was awarded compensatory and pu-
nitive damages against both defendants.' On appeal, both defendants
claimed that the imposition of punitive damages against the radio sta-
tion based on the doctrine of respondeat superior violated the first
amendment, as interpreted by recent United States Supreme Court de-
cisions, by imposing liability without proof of fault. In Embrey v.
1. Embrey v. Holly, 293 Md. 128, 132, 442 A.2d 966, 968 (1982). During a comedy
news routine on his morning radio program, James Embrey, Jr., known profes-
sionally as Johnny Walker, truthfully reported that Baltimore television news-
caster Dennis Holly was about to undergo knee surgery. In a rebroadcast later
that morning, Embrey made these additional comments about Holly: "Too bad
about Dennis Holly, though.. . . Wonder how he hurt his knee? Probably fell
down carrying that TV during the blizzard last week, right?" During a blizzard in
1979, looters took advantage of immobilized police vehicles and broke into nu-
merous commercial establishments in downtown Baltimore. The jury found these
comments libelous and awarded Holly $25,000 in compensatory damages against
both defendants, and punitive damages of $5,000 against Embrey and $35,000
against his employer, Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. Id at 131-32, 442 A.2d at 967-
68.
2. Id at 133, 442 A.2d at 968.
3. Id at 132, 442 A.2d at 968. Respondeat superior, also known as vicarious liabil-
ity, is defined as the liability of a master for the tortious acts of his servant, com-
mitted within the scope of employment. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 69 (4th ed. 1971).
In addition, the radio station and Embrey appealed on the ground that puni-
tive damages should not be apportioned between the broadcaster and the radio
station. Embrey, 293 Md. at 133, 442 A.2d at 968. The Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland had sua sponte reversed the trial court's ruling that it was proper to
permit the jury to impose punitive damages in differing amounts to the two de-
fendants. Embrey, 48 Md. App. at 587, 429 A.2d at 262, afldin part, rev'd inpart,
293 Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966 (1982).
Prior to Embrey, the Maryland rule concerning apportionment of punitive
damages was unclear. In Nance v. Gall, 187 Md. 656, 51 A.2d 535 (1946), the
court of appeals held that a jury verdict against a railroad employee and the rail-
road company resulted in a joint verdict, and therefore punitive damages were not
apportioned. Thus, when the judgment was reversed as to the railroad company,
the joint judgment for damages could not stand against only one defendant. Id at
675, 51 A.2d at 536. In a subsequent case, the court of special appeals, "inclined"
by Nance, upheld the apportionment of punitive damages against joint
tortfeasors. Cheek v. J.B.G. Properties, Inc., 28 Md. App. 29, 43, 344 A.2d 180,
189-90 (1975). However, in Meleski v. Pinero Restaurant, 47 Md. App. 526, 550,
424 A.2d 784, 797 (1981), the court of special appeals retreated from the Cheek
decision, holding that Nance should not be read so broadly as to permit the ap-
portionment of punitive damages between joint tortfeasors. The Meleski court
stated that only the court of appeals or the legislature is free to change the Mary-
land rule on apportionment. Id In Embrey, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
resolved this issue by ruling that punitive damages should be apportioned be-
tween joint tortfeasors based on their culpability and pecuniary wealth in order
that the damages be fair and effective. Embrey, 293 Md. at 141-42, 442 A.2d at
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Holy, 4 the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the trial court's
judgment, holding that punitive damages may be imposed upon the
employer for defamatory remarks made by his employee when the em-
ployee acts within the scope of his employment.5
Although it is well established that compensatory damages may be
awarded under the doctrine of respondeat superior, there is a split of
authority concerning the awarding of punitive damages.6 Maryland is
among the majority of jurisdictions that applies a "broad respondeat
superior doctrine," holding an employer vicariously liable for punitive
damages when the employee's tortious acts are committed within the
scope of employment, even in the absence of the employer's authoriza-
tion, participation, or ratification.' Advocates of the broad respondeat
superior doctrine argue that the award of punitive damages provides a
deterrent effect by encouraging employers to exercise closer control
over their employees and by preventing the re-occurrence of similar
acts.9 Furthermore, the employer is deemed to be in a better position
to bear any loss caused by the employee's actions through the acquisi-
tion of liability insurance.' 0
However, several courts have noted the injustice of punishing the
employer - an innocent party." This is particularly true when the
employer is a corporation and its stockholders suffer a loss because of
an employee's tortious conduct.' 2 As a result, a minority position has
evolved requiring some degree of complicity by the employer for liabil-
973. For a further discussion of apportionment of damages, see Note, Apportion-
ment of Punitive Damages, 38 VA. L. REv. 71 (1952); Apportionment of Punitive or
Exemplary Damages as Between Joint Torqfeasors, Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 666
(1968).
4. 293 Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966 (1982).
5. Id at 140, 442 A.2d at 973.
6. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed. 1971). Compensa-
tory damages are awarded to compensate or indemnify a person for the harm
sustained. Superior Constr. Co. v. Elmo, 204 Md. 1, 14, 104 A.2d 581, 582 (1954)(quoting the Restatement of Torts § 903 (1934)). Punitive, or exemplary, damages
are "awarded over and above full compensation, to punish the wrongdoer, to
teach him not to repeat his wrongful conduct and to deter others from engaging in
the same conduct." Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 531, 366 A.2d
7, 12 (1976).
7. Embrey, 293 Md. at 137-38, 442 A.2d at 971; see Note, The Assessment o/Punitive
Damages Against an Entrepreneurfor the Malicious Torts of His Employees, 70
YALE J. 1296 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Assessment of Punitive Damages. ]
8. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed. 1971); see, e.g.,
Weston Coach Corp. v. Vaugh, 9 Ariz. App. 336, 452 P.2d 117 (1967); Life Ins.
Co. of North America v. Knoll Inc., 389 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1980); Safeway Stores,
Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168, 176-77, 122 A.2d 457, 461-62 (1956).
9. Assessment of Punitive Damages, supra note 7, at 1301.
10. See id at 1303.
11. See, e.g., Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107-08 (1893); Hart-
man v. Shell Oil Co., 68 Cal. App. 3d 240, 249, 137 Cal. Rptr. 244, 250 (1977).
For additional jurisdictions applying this view of respondeat superior, see Assess-
ment of Punitive Damages, supra note 7, at 1300 n.35.
12. Assessment of Punitive Damages, supra note 7, at 1306-07.
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ity to attach.1 3 Under the "complicity rule,"' 4 as expressed in section
909 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the employer is vicariously
liable for punitive damages only when the employer authorizes, partici-
pates in, or ratifies the employee's tortious activity. 5
Application of the complicity rule in defamation suits raises no
constitutional controversy, because an employer has participated in the
tortious activity. Application of the broad respondeat superior rule,
however, creates conflicts with first amendment constitutional privi-
leges which protect the media's exercise of freedom of speech and
press. 6 The United States Supreme Court has held that public offi-
cials,' 7 public figures,'" and private individuals involved in an event of
public interest' 9 may not recover either punitive or compensatory dam-
ages without proof that the defamatory statements were made with ac-
tual malice.2°
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,21 the Court extended the privilege
13. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (4th ed. 1971).
14. See Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 216, 221
(1960).
15. The RESTATEMENT provides:
Punitive damages can properly be awarded against a master or other
principal because of an act by an agent if, but only if,
(a) the principal or a managerial agent authorized the doing and the
manner of the act, or
(b) the agent was unfit and the principal or a managerial agent was reck-
less in employing or retaining him, or
(c) the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in
the scope of employment, or
(d) the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or ap-
proved the act.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909 (1977).
16. For a general discussion of the first amendment constitutional privileges, see
Black, A Constitutional Revolution in the Law of Libel" New York Times and
Gertz Applied, 11 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 611, 612-20 (1980).
17. New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). No award. of punitive or
compensatory damages for defamation is constitutionally permissible when the
publication deals with the official conduct of public officials unless the statement
was made with actual malice. Id at 283. In New York Times, a judgment for
damages awarded in an Alabama state court, based on a newspaper's advertise-
ment, was reversed because the plaintiff, the Montgomery, Alabama police com-
missioner, failed to prove actual malice on the part of the defendants. Id at 285-
86.
18. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). A football coach attained the
status of a public figure by his position, while in a companion case, a person in-
volved in political activities attained his status of public figure by "purposeful
activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the 'vortex' of important
public controversy .. ." Id at 155.
19. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 402 U.S. 29 (1971). The arrest of a private indi-
vidual for the sale of allegedly obscene material constituted an event of public or
general interest. Id at 41-42.
20. New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). Actual malice is
defined by the Court to mean "without knowledge that [the statement] was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id
21. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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by ruling that a private individual may not be awarded punitive dam-
ages in a defamation suit against the media absent a showing of actual
malice.22 However, when awarding compensatory damages in defama-
tion suits brought by private individuals, the Court held that the states
are free to determine the proper standard "so long as they do not im-
pose liability without fault."23 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
attempted to balance the countervailing state interest in protecting pri-
vate individuals from defamatory falsehoods with the federal constitu-
tional interest in protecting freedom of speech and press.24
While the Supreme Court has not specifically decided whether pu-
nitive damages may be imposed upon employers for their employees'
defamatory acts, some insights may be gleaned from the Gertz decision
and a subsequent case.25 In Gertz, a publisher was held not liable for
defamatory statements contained in an article written by a free-lance
writer.26 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, noting that mere
proof of the publisher's failure to investigate, without more, was not
sufficient to establish actual malice on the part of the publisher.27 Since
the plaintiff did not argue the respondeat superior theory to the Court,
it is unclear whether the theory does not apply in cases involving the
constitutional privilege scheme, or that the theory would have failed on
the facts presented in Gerz. 21
Respondeat superior was utilized in Cantrell v. Forest City Publish-
ing Co., 29 when the Court held a publisher liable for the defamatory
statements of its regular staff writers.3" The jury verdict against the
publisher was upheld under the doctrine of respondeat superior even
though the plaintiff failed to prove the publisher's actual malice.31
Therefore, a distinction appears to exist between defamatory state-
ments made by independent contractors such as free-lance employees,
and servants such as regular employees.32
22. Id at 349.
23. Id at 347. Maryland has adopted negligence as the standard of liability for pri-
vate individual's defamation suits. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindrof, 276 Md. 580, 596-
97, 350 A.2d 688, 697 (1976).
24. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348.
25. For a discussion of the doctrine of vicarious liability in light of the Gertz decision,
see Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REv. 199, 246-47 (1976).
26. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 331-47.
27. Plaintiff raised the doctrine of respondeat superior for the first time before the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. This claim was dismissed because the
plaintiff failed to establish an "employer-employee" relationship. Gertz, 471 F.2d
at 807 n.15 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
28. See Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 54 Tax. L. REv. 199, 246 (1976).
29. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
30. Id at 252-54.
31. Id at 253.
32. For a discussion of the differences between servants and independent contractors,
see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 70-71 (4th ed. 1971);
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In Embrey v. Holly, 3 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held a
radio station liable for the defamatory remarks of its broadcaster de-
spite the station's contention that the award of punitive damages under
te doctrine of respondeat superior imposed liability without fault.34
The majority ruled that Gertz was inapplicable because that decision
involved the constitutional limitations imposed upon a state when
awarding compensatory and punitive damages in defamation suits
brought by private individuals.3 In contrast, Embrey involved the
award of compensatory and punitive damages in a defamation suit
brought by a public figure.36 The majority also noted that the dissent
in Embrey misread Gertz because "an act done with fault can be com-
mitted vicariously by an employer acting through its employee. 37 The
Embrey court stated that the Maryland courts have consistently im-
posed vicarious liability on the employer for the tortious acts of the
employee. 38 Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that the policy
of free expression fostered by the first amendment is overridden by the
state interests of protecting citizens from defamatory conduct and de-
terring future misconduct.3 Thus, a narrower standard should not be
used in defamation suits involving the imposition of punitive damages
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.'
Writing for the dissent, Chief Judge Murphy contended that a dif-
ferent standard should be used in first amendment cases and argued
that the court should adopt the Restatement test permitting punitive
damages against an employer only when he has authorized, partici-
pated in, or ratified his employee's tortious act.4 ' The dissent claimed
that the majority "bootstrap[ped]" the doctrine of respondeat superior
into a finding of fault against the employer radio station in direct viola-
tion of Gertz. 42
The Embrey opinion dismisses Gertz as being "not dispositive"4 3
without fully discussing whether the doctrine of respondeat superior is
a form of strict liability prohibited by Supreme Court mandate. In an-
alyzing the Gertz decision and other defamation cases, it appears that
James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TULANE L. REV. 161, 193-207 (1954); Steffen, In-
dependent Contractors and the Good Life, 2 U. CHI. L. REv. 501, 501-02 (1935).
33. 293 Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966 (1982).
34. Id at 140, 442 A.2d at 972-73.
35. Id at 139, 442 A.2d at 972.
36. In this instance Holly acknowledged that he was a public figure. Id at n. 12, 442
A.2d at 972 n.12.
37. Id at 139 n.13, 442 A.2d at 972 n.13.
38. Id at 135, 442 A.2d at 970. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Barrack, 210 Md. 168,
176-77, 122 A.2d 457, 461-62 (1956); W.W. Boyer & Co. v. Coxen, 92 Md. 366,
368, 48 A. 161, 162 (1901); Baltimore & Yorktown Turnpike v. Boone, 45 Md.
337, 354-56 (1876); B & 0 R.R. Co. v. Blocher, 27 Md. 277, 286 (1867).
39. Embrey, 293 Md. at 138, 442 A.2d at 971.
40. Id at 140, 442 A.2d at 972.
41. Id at 144-45, 442 A.2d at 975 (Murphy, C.J., dissenting).
42. Id
43. Id at 139, 442 A.2d at 972.
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the Supreme Court does not prohibit the application of the doctrine."
The different results in Gertz and Cantrell may be attributed to the
usual tort distinctions between servants and independent contractors.45
However, the Embrey court never reaches this issue. Nor does the
court give proper consideration to the policy behind the first amend-
ment constitutional privileges, which attempt to provide the media with
the "breathing space"' necessary for the free flow of information and
ideas. Instead, the court of appeals relied on the broad respondeat su-
perior doctrine, a doctrine which has been subject to criticism by many
in the business sector who claim that large awards under this rule may
overload liability insurance rates and deplete corporate reserves.47 The
critics advocate the adoption of the complicity rule since punitive dam-
ages are then awarded only when an employer's culpability justly re-
quires him to assume his portion of the punishment.48
The arguments against the broad respondeat superior rule may be
justified in some cases, but are not persuasive in others. The strongest
justification for the broad respondeat superior rule is deterrence of fu-
ture tortious misconduct.49 The employer, though an innocent party,
may "secretly applaud" the employee's tortious acts if it costs nothing,
since the employee's conduct may result in future profits to an em-
ployer.50 In the present case, the radio station may not have authorized
the specific comment. However, the station may have implicitly en-
couraged this type of comment, in an effort to increase its listening au-
dience, since it was characteristic of others made by Embrey on his
program. For these reasons, the award of punitive damages under the
application of the broad respondeat superior doctrine in defamation
cases may effectuate the policy behind the constitutional privilege
scheme by accommodating state defamation law and the first amend-
ment freedoms of speech and press.
Susan M Moses
44. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
45. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REv. 199, 266-67 (1976).
46. New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) (quoting NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
47. Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 216, 217-18
(1960).
48. Id at 220-21; see also Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 114-15
(1892).
49. United Securities Corp. v. Franklin, 180 A.2d 505, 511 (D.C. 1962); Eshelman v.
Rawait, 198 Ill. 192, 197, 131 N.E. 675, 677 (1921).
50. Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 216, 218-19
(1960).
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